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Abstract
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Expanding International Regimes
by
Thomas Goggin

Advisor: Dr. Stephanie Golob
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is on track to become the largest free trade agreement in
history. The multilateral negotiations comprising twelve nations across the Pacific Rim seeks to
create a robust, comprehensive trade accord for the 21st century. The regional trade deal was born
in the midst of an international climate of rapidly expanding free trade agreements. The TPP is not
merely the latest free trade agreement. Due to the size, scope, and focus on unconventional trade
issues, the TPP, led by the United States, will expand particular international regimes beyond
existing norms in two key areas: intellectual property and investor-state dispute settlements. This
expansionist approach has implications for geostrategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region and
emerging hegemonic trends.
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I) Introduction
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed multilateral trade agreement, is on track
to become the largest free trade agreement (FTA) in history. The negotiating nations – Australia,
Brunei-Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore,
Vietnam, and the United States – comprise roughly 40% of global gross domestic product (GDP).
The Asia-Pacific region comprises over 60% of U.S. trade and 25% of its foreign direct
investment.1 The regional trade deal’s ambitious agenda contains numerous objectives, such as
reducing tariffs and non-trade barriers, increasing foreign direct investment, improving access to
foreign markets, protecting intellectual property, and promoting job growth.2
In addition to its unprecedented scope, the TPP has also created more than its share of
controversy, generating stark and polarizing discourse. Its proponents have highlighted the
expected benefits of economic liberalization they claim will result from such a deal, including
rising levels of GDP, increasing trade surplus, and job creation.3 Opponents have been vehemently
critical, lambasting the TPP for its potentially destructive environmental impact, compression of
middle class wages, and infringement of labor rights.4 The debate has often been

Brock R. Williams, “Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis”
Congressional Research Service (2013)
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2020&context=key_workplace, Accessed May 18,
2015
2
John Whalley, “Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?” in The Regionalization of the World
Economy, ed. Jeffrey Frankel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 63-90.
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7820.pdf, Accessed June 1, 2015
3
See William Daley, “Free Trade Is Not the Enemy” The New York Times, May 19, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/opinion/free-trade-is-not-the-enemy.html?ref=international, Accessed August
10, 2015; Suzy Khimm, “Democrats Support Free Trade More Than Republicans Do: So Why the Big Split Over the
TPP?” The New Republic June 8, 2015. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121989/trans-pacific-partnershipdivides-left-dems-support-free-trade, Accessed August 10, 2015
4
See Joseph Stiglitz, “Don’t Trade Away Our Health”, The New York Times, January 30, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/opinion/dont-trade-away-our-health.html?smid=pl-share, Accessed August
10, 2015; Sen. Elizabeth Warren, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone should oppose,” The Washington
Post, February 25, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-thetrans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html, Accessed August 10,
2015
1
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volatile and lacked context. For example, analysts and stakeholders have frequently compared
the TPP to the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These comparisons,
stemming in part from NAFTA’s scope, ambition, and historical alignment of North America,
are superficially accurate. However, NAFTA’s primary goals focused on traditional trade issues
such as boosting manufacturing and agricultural production, reducing tariffs and non-trade
barriers, and improving transportation. Although NAFTA did include unconventional trade
provisions, the agreement was largely based on traditional forms of economic integration.
The imprecise comparison between the two regional agreements fails to account for many
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s extraordinary goals. In reality, as this thesis will contend, the
TPP seeks to broaden the definition and use of particular international regimes beyond current
normative standards. As the main driver of the TPP, the United States’ aggressive pursuit to
expand specific provisions illuminates a few of the U.S.’ primary goals for the Asia-Pacific treaty.
This expansionist approach toward international regimes such as intellectual property and
investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS), can be identified by comparing U.S. negotiators’ tactics
across free trade agreements, detailing the existing levels of normative acceptance, and careful
review of leaked text and public record. Regime expansion in each issue area has serious
geostrategic implications for the Asia-Pacific region, as well as emerging hegemonic trends.
The subsequent argument is broken into four main sections. The first section, the ensuing
introductory subchapter, provides historical context for international trade and free trade
agreements. This brief overview examines free trade, specifically from an American perspective,
painting a picture of the landscape in which the TPP negotiations have been taking place. The
evolutionary path leading up to the TPP negotiations elucidates current U.S. efforts to secure
radical expansion in unconventional trade areas.

3

In the second section, the literature review presents key scholarship and themes from
relevant areas including NAFTA, TPP, regimes, and norm diffusion. Although NAFTA
literature is robust and diverse, three core themes – U.S. negotiations, economic and political
gains, and power asymmetries – are relevant to my central inquiry. Similarly, three themes from
the budding TPP literature focus on economic and trade impact, geostrategic implications, and
nontrade related issues. Additionally, international relations scholarship analyzing regime
development and norm diffusion are particularly important. While these core pieces of
scholarship are selected for their strengths, my thesis aims to fill in gaps in TPP-related
literature. The current literature largely critiques the economic, political, and strategic
implications of the agreement, yet fails to analyze U.S. efforts seeking regime expansion,
specifically in the areas of intellectual property and ISDS.
The third section focuses on the United States’ intentions and ambitions. As the largest
TPP partner, the United States’ agenda will greatly impact the overall agreement. The argument
positions NAFTA alongside the TPP to help elucidate key contributions that the Asia-Pacific
partnership is designed to make. Due to U.S. military, economic, and strategic strength, its
negotiators employ aggressive and hostile tactics hoping to gain concessions in exchange for
access to a dynamic U.S. market. Within the TPP discussions, U.S. negotiators are steadfastly
presenting proposals and arguments seeking intellectual property and investor-state regime
expansion. The level to which regime expansion materializes will be impacted by the TPP
partner’s negotiating leverage, as well as domestic political constraints. The TPP partners are
active agents with true power, yet the United States’ strategic position acts as a major force for
regime expansion. U.S. proposals aim to push international intellectual property rights beyond
current norms by broadening provisions for patentability, copyright protections, and enforcement

4

measures. Moreover, the TPP in its proposed form will further entrench ISDS by increasing the
frequency of ISDS claims, misuse of the ISDS mechanism, and infringements on state
sovereignty. Although U.S. negotiators are doggedly pursuing such policies, domestic factors
may force them into concessions in these areas. Influential domestic variables include upcoming
national elections, the conclusion of a presidential term, and congressional politics.
In the fourth and final section, three main geopolitical conditions are analyzed because of
their inevitable collision with Asia-Pacific integration led by the United States. The first of these
conditions is China’s historic ascendancy, a direct threat to American hegemony. From a U.S.
strategic viewpoint, the TPP counters this rise and bolsters relations with Washington’s allies in
the region. Secondly, the TPP must remain a desirable trade pact in order to stave off
competition from the Regional Cooperative Economic Partnership (RCEP). Membership in the
RCEP includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)5 plus Australia, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. The RCEP, led by China, is less robust than the
TPP, focuses on traditional tariff and barrier issues, and stresses equitable development. The free
trade negotiations will directly compete with the TPP and impact U.S. geopolitics in the region.
Lastly, climate change may become the most significant geopolitical condition for all nations.
President Obama’s Clean Power Plan, which establishes carbon pollution limits from power
plants, details the changing landscape of energy production. 6 Energy outputs can no longer
disregard environmental consequences. The future relationship between energy and climate
change will impact Asia-Pacific integration. The agreement’s finalized environmental chapter

5

ASEAN membership includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
6
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: President Obama to Announce Historic Carbon
Pollution Standards for Power Plants” August, 3, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/08/03/fact-sheet-president-obama-announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards, Accessed August 13,
2015.
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must include comprehensive and binding text on climate emissions and environmental protection
if the accord is to retain vitality throughout the century. These three geopolitical issues will
directly impact the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s implementation and greater regional integration.

Historical Context
Placing the Trans-Pacific Partnership in a historical context unveils shifting ideological
patterns while highlighting trends in trade promotion. From 1860 – 1913, international trade
lacked any form of a cohesive agenda. Most bilateral negotiations focused primarily on mostfavored-nation (MFN) clauses providing an egalitarian platform for trade; states were free to
decide tariff levels, as long as the same tariff was granted to all partners. 7 This prewar period
experienced significant growth in international trade. Despite increasing integration, the outbreak
of World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II severely disrupted previous bilateral
trade practices. After 1932, in spite of increases in overall output, trade could not keep pace with
economic growth due in part to protectionist policies such as higher tariffs, import quotas, and
licensing requirements.8 Postwar liberal architects based future policy decisions on the
relationship between peace and economic integration. The General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) came into existence in 1948 and provided consensus on issues such as MFN,
internal taxation and regulation, anti-dumping measures and duties, and the elimination of
quantitative restrictions.9 The GATT did help reduce tariffs in the postwar period in many
sectors, but some industries such as agriculture and textiles retained various protectionist
measures.

Douglas Irwin, “The GATT in Historical Perspective.” The American Economic Review, 85.2 (1995): 323–28.
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/docs/GATTHP.pdf, Accessed June 5, 2015
8
Ibid, p. 323.
9
World Trade Organization, The General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. (1986)
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf, Accessed March 22, 2015.
7
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The GATT’s post-World War II economic reconstruction efforts greatly reduced world
trade barriers.10 The GATT’s nine Rounds, largely a forum for trade negotiations, provided a
platform for robust dialogue and debate leading to cooperation.11 After almost four decades of
work, the GATT’s evolution into a complete organization was clear, and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was established in 1995. The WTO builds on the work of the GATT by
adding areas of focus such as dispute settlement mechanisms. U.S. hegemony played a principal
role in ensuring that each mechanism helped foster an environment favorable for economic
liberalization. Each international institution, the GATT and WTO, underscores U.S. efforts to
normalize multilateral trade deals while increasing market access. This institutional growth
favored norms and rules which promoted an American hegemonic order. The development of
international institutions in the post-World War II era was a primary mechanism for helping open
borders, while striving for peace through economic integration.
The contemporary era of U.S. trade policy begins in the 1980s with the 1988 CanadaUnited States FTA. This agreement helped reduce tariffs, eliminated barriers to trade, and
became the precursor to NAFTA. Negotiations for North American integration began under the
administrations of George H.W. Bush, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and Brian Mulroney. When
Bush ceremonially signed the agreement, he described a hemisphere “of peace, where trade
flows freely, prosperity is shared, the rule of law is respected, and the gifts of human knowledge
are harnessed for all.”12 He invoked images of Simon Bolivar, the realization of Bolivar’s
unification attempts, and the amalgamation of a hemisphere. During the closing months of 1992,

Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz, “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the
Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade” International Organization 61.1 (2007): 37-67.
https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/GRT_IO2007.pdf, Accessed August 13, 2015
11
Irwin, 6.
12
The American Presidency Project, December 17, 1992.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21784&st=&st1=, Accessed April 4, 2015
10
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Bush lost his reelection campaign to Bill Clinton. As a free trade advocate, Clinton gave
leadership to the final stages of negotiation. Due to intense opposition from Congressional
Democrats over environmental and labor issues, Clinton negotiated side accords to ease
Congressional ratification.13 On December 8, 1993, Clinton signed the NAFTA text. The treaty
came into force on January 1, 1994.
The discourse around the NAFTA negotiations and implementation was rancorous.
Public outrage, such as the Zapatista uprising in 1994 and Seattle’s 1999 protests, demonstrated
specific furor over NAFTA, globalization, and free trade. Led by rebel leader Subcommander
Marcos in the state of Chiapas, the uprising quickly became international news.14 The revolt of
an armed group of farmers highlighted the plight of Mexico’s native population.15 This dramatic
event brought increasingly more cognizance to the destructive effects of globalization. In
addition, public awareness of the negotiations grew as a result of the volatile dialogue in the
American political system. In the 1992 presidential election, Ross Perot secured nearly 20% of
votes cast, the most of any third party candidate since 1912.16 Perot’s anti-NAFTA platform
typified such volatility by describing American job losses as “a giant sucking sound.”17
The degree to which NAFTA has succeeded has been exhaustively argued. Trade on the
continent has substantially increased since 1994. Mexico and Canada are two of the United
States largest trading partners. In 2014, both countries imported over $500 billion of U.S.

Bill Clinton, “Remarks on the Signing of NAFTA” The Miller Center. December 8, 1993.
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3927, Accessed August 16, 2015
14
Anthony DePalma, “Press in Mexico Docile on Revolt.” The New York Times, March 6, 1994, sec. World.
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/06/world/press-in-mexico-docile-on-revolt.html. Accessed June 12, 2015
15
Aileen Yoo, “The Call of Zapata.” The Washington Post, Update: August, 1998.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/mexico/overview/rebellion.htm, Accessed June 12, 2015.
16
Ted G. Jelen, “The Perot Campaign in Theoretical Perspective.” in Ross for Boss: The Perot Phenomenon and
Beyond, ed. Ted G. Jelen (Albany: State University of New York, 2001): 1-13
http://ahd1113.activehost.com/pdf/60295.pdf, Accessed August 24, 2015.
17
Gary, Hufbauer, “Ross Perot Was Wrong About NAFTA” The New York Times, November 25, 2013
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/24/what-weve-learned-from-nafta/ross-perot-was-wrong-aboutnafta, August 16, 2015
13
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products; the United States imported over $600 billion of Canadian and Mexican products.18
Conversely, many point to increased income inequality, the compression of middle class wages,
and increased carbon emissions as evidence of NAFTA’s debilitating effects.19 Despite these
diverging views on North American integration’s success, the agreement helped lay a foundation
for future trade agreements throughout the world.
Since NAFTA, the United States as negotiated numerous FTAs with countries across the
world such as Jordan, Australia, Chile, Singapore, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Dominican
Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, and
South Korea. Under the George W. Bush administration, numerous FTAs were commenced.
Receiving Trade Promotion Authority (TPA or “fast track authority”) from Congress in 2002,
President Bush quickened the pace of the negotiations.20 Aggressive negotiations of FTAs have
not been limited to Republican Presidents and House of Representatives majorities. President
Barack Obama and the 112th Congress approved bills for FTAs with Panama, Colombia, and
South Korea despite concerns of violence towards union officials, taxation regimes, and the auto
trade, respectively.21 Through active leadership in the GATT and WTO, the United States has
not only passed FTAs but also helped foster a global environment toward greater integration.
The WTO reports that roughly 200 FTAs are in place around the world.22 The growth of
international trade agreements has helped standardize international regimes and norms under a
U.S.-led free trade agenda.

18

Williams (2013), p. 14.
David Rosnick, “Gains from Trade? The Net Effect of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement on U.S. Wages”
Center for Economic and Policy Research (2013) http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/TPP-2013-09.pdf,
Accessed June 10, 2015.
20
William H. Cooper, “Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy”
Congressional Research Service, (2014): p 5,
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2252&context=key_workplace, Accessed April
20, 2015.
21
Ibid.
22
Williams (2013), p4.
19

9

The origins of the TPP date back over a decade to the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership comprising Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand. Brunei later joined the negotiations,
which came to be known as the P-4 agreement. On September 22, 2008, President Bush alerted
Congress of his intentions to begin dialogue with the P-4 for a free trade deal. Three months later
Australia, Peru and Vietnam would declare their intentions to participate as well.23 President
Obama in his first year in office, despite having opposed many of the Bush administration’s
policies, formally announced plans to partake in the negotiation process for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership on November 14, 2009. While visiting Japan’s Suntory Hall, Obama first announced
that, “the United States will also be engaging with the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries with
the goal of shaping a regional agreement that will have broad-based membership and the
standards worthy of a 21st century trade agreement.”24 Canada, Mexico, and Malaysia followed
the United States, with Japan being the last partner to join the negotiations.
Although the final text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership has not been finalized, and
finished chapters have not been released, there are some substantive details known to the public.
A few of the current negotiating topics include market access for goods and services, investment
and financial services, and intellectual property rights.25 The agreement is designed to operate as
a living agreement allowing new partners to join during the negotiation or accede at the
conclusion of the process.26 Additionally, like previous U.S. FTAs, the proposed structural
design includes a dispute settlement mechanism; disputing parties are encouraged to host initial
consultations and establish a dispute settlement panel consisting of three arbiters.27

23

Ibid, p.1
“Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall.” Whitehouse.gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall, Accessed June 12, 2015.
25
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Outlines of TPP”. https://ustr.gov/tpp/outlines-of-TPP,
Accessed August, 10, 2015.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
24
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Two of the agreement’s more controversial components are labor and the environment.
Both issues, added to NAFTA as side agreements, are included in recent FTAs. Special reports
from the United States Trade Representative (USTR) emphasize the abolition of forced and child
labor, elimination of discrimination in employment, and consolidation of commitments from
countries not to ignore labor rights.28 The proposed environmental chapter asks countries to
enforce their own laws while abiding by multilateral environmental agreements. Environmental
advocates have expressed early concern over leaked drafts of the environmental chapter.29
Alongside substantive knowledge of the agreement, public records give insight into the
vested parties and interests that have much to gain from specific provisions in the TPP. For
example, in a letter to the USTR on November 22, 2010, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) detailed their association’s needs in relation to Malaysia’s
participation, writing, “America’s research-based biopharmaceutical companies seek a
commercial and regulatory environment that: (1) recognizes the value of medical innovation; (2)
provides strong protection for intellectual property rights; and (3) ensures timely, transparent, and
science-based regulatory policies that accord with common international practices.”30 Chapters
related to intellectual property rights and pharmaceutical investment protections are present in the
proposed drafts. In addition, speeches given by President Obama describe actions taken to
generate support among vested groups, including statements to the Business

United States Trade Representative, “Standing Up for Workers: Promoting Labor Rights through Trade” (2015)
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%20DOL%20Trade%20-%20Labor%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf,
Accessed July 30, 2015.
29
“Green Groups: Leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership Environment Chapter Unacceptable.” Sierra Club National.
http://content.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2014/01/green-groups-leaked-trans-pacific-partnership-environmentchapter, Accessed July 31, 2015.
30
Docket Wrench - Document: USTR-2010-0031-0014.” Docket Wrench.
http://docketwrench.sunlightfoundation.com/document/USTR-2010-0031-0014. Accessed July 30, 2015.
28
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Roundtable,31 an association of chief executive officers of major U.S. companies designed to
promote economic public policy; remarks to US-ASEAN leaders;32 and the APEC CEO
Summit.33 These speeches and open letters provide insight into issues of priority for
corporations and the USTR, as well as demonstrate the disproportionate access granted to
business leaders during early negotiating periods through direct stakeholder engagements.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a 21st century trade agreement with roots dating back
over two decades. From a United States perspective, while the TPP is the most recent initiative to
further economic liberalization, it is not merely another international trade agreement. The United
States already has FTA agreements with 6 of 11 TPP partners. The remaining TPP partners –
Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam – will become increasingly interconnected
with the United States by signing the regional free trade deal. By binding nations in an
international treaty with the potential for countries to accede, the U.S. hopes to advance
unconventional trade issues such as intellectual property and ISDS regimes in their own image.
Ultimately, the Asia-Pacific agreement’s focus on nontraditional trade issues pushes beyond
provisions and norms of NAFTA and subsequent FTAs. By pursuing policies to expand existing
international regimes, the TPP will must be recognized for its distinct potentiality.

“Remarks by the President at the Business Roundtable.” Whitehouse.gov. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/12/03/remarks-president-business-roundtable, Accessed May 5, 2015.
32
“Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall, 11/14/14.”
Whitehouse.gov. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/14/remarks-president-obama-youngsoutheast-asian-leaders-initiative-town-ha, Accessed July 30, 2015.
33
“Remarks by President Obama at APEC CEO Summit.” Whitehouse.gov. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/10/remarks-president-obama-apec-ceo-summit, Accessed July 30, 2015.
31
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Chapter II) Literature Review
In this chapter, I will draw upon a wide range of literatures – NAFTA, TPP, regimes, and
normative diffusion – to support my contention that the TPP is a norm-expanding trade
agreement. NAFTA’s divergent, yet sizable body of literature is useful in three key areas:
economic and trade impact, geostrategic implications, and nontrade related issues. Extrapolating
these three themes appropriately frames the TPP’s existing environment while highlighting the
United States attempts to expand intellectual property and ISDS regimes. The TPP literature,
while less robust due to the agreement’s infancy, has similar analytic strands throughout the
current body of scholarly work such as economic and trade impact, geostrategic implications,
and nontrade related issues. Moreover, international relations scholarship examining regime
development and norm diffusion are particularly relevant and help illustrate Washington’s
expansionist intentions.
The scholarly and policy-oriented literatures detailing North American integration,
implementation, and impact are extensive and diverse. For over twenty years, NAFTA has
remained a quintessential topic for work relating to economic integration, immigration,
globalization and free trade, climate science, and a host of related disciplines. Although
scholarship on NAFTA has developed for over two decades, three core themes stand out as most
relevant to my argument: U.S. negotiations,34 economic and political implications,35 and

See David Rankin, (2004) “Borderline Interest or Identity? American and Canadian Opinion on the North
American Free Trade Agreement” Comparative Politics. 36.3 (2004)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150134?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, Accessed July 30, 2015, for U.S. and
Canadian public perceptions on significance of NAFTA’s implementation; Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, “Is
NAFTA Constitutional” Harvard Law Review 108.4 (1995).
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1341958?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, Accessed July 31, 2015, for historical
perspective on domestic legislative changes leading up to NAFTA;
35
See Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, “NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges” Washington, DC:
Peterson Institute for International Economics, (2005)
http://iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=898, Accessed May 28, 2015, for comprehensive analysis
on employment, trade and investment, and labor and environmental impact.
34
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asymmetrical power dynamics.36 First, Cameron and Tomlin retrace the inner workings of the
NAFTA negotiations by detailing the United States’ willingness to aggressively negotiate early
and often.37 U.S. negotiators were able to use the size of the American market as leverage, while
winning favorable concessions due to the potential of Congressional obstruction. Additionally,
domestic factors such as the desire to secure an agreement before the 1992 elections impacted
U.S. negotiations.
Second, Hufbauer, Schott, and Orejas provide a comprehensive analysis of the economic
outcomes of NAFTA.38 North American integration did achieve many of its objectives including
increased trade and cooperation among the three nations, yet failed in some sectors including
trucking and lumber. They highlight key economic indicators of increased economic integration,
yet stress the agreements shortcomings in areas such as immigration, labor, and environmental
degradation. Villareal and Ferguson analyze NAFTA’s economic impact two decades after its
completion.39 They note the tremendous growth in trade between Mexico and the United States,
and increasing imports in crude petroleum and motor vehicles. They highlight the difficulty in
analyzing NAFTA because many transnational integrations were happening concurrently,
however its importance to subsequent FTAs is stark. NAFTA’s obligations presented a framework
and environment for subsequent trade agreements to operate in.

Tom Long, “Echoes of 1992: The NAFTA Negotiations and North America Now” Wilson Center (2014)
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Long_NAFTA_and_Now_0.pdf, Accessed May 24, 2015
37
See Maxwell Cameron and Brian Tomlin, NAFTA: How the Deal Was Done. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2000) Print.
38
Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Diana Orejas, “NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges”
(Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2005) Print.
39
M. Angeles Villareal and Ian Ferguson, “NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects” (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2014)
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2272&context=key_workplace, Accessed June 2,
2015
36
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Third, Long presents a historical perspective on NAFTA, Mexico’s political system, and
asymmetry in the North American relationship.40 He highlights Salinas’ process to guide Mexico
through a landscape of evolving international trading blocs. Due to Mexico’s perilous economic
condition and a global shift toward regional trading blocs, Salinas was initially forced to seek out
alternative trading partners including Europe and Asia. Ultimately, Salinas found partners in the
existing North American trading alliance of Canada and the United States. Although power
asymmetries between Mexico and the United States were great, Salinas’ deep desire for
economic liberalization helped develop a strong relationship with President Bush. Additionally,
Cameron and Tomlin highlight the significant gaps in asymmetries between Mexico and the
United States. This asymmetry enables both Mexico and the United States to leverage areas of
power to further concessions on energy and agriculture.41
Although the Trans-Pacific Partnership has recently become a popular topic among
editorialists and commentators, the negotiations’ ongoing nature have made academic
scholarship less entrenched on the issue. The TPP literature is often policy-oriented and
analytically based, focusing on the economic impact for varying bodies. Due to the ongoing
nature of the TPP negotiations, researchers face different variables and circumstances depending
on the year of authorship. Despite the uncertainty of conditions, there are three critical areas of
TPP literature: economic and trade impact, geostrategic implications, and nontrade related issues.
First, due to the size of the Trans-Pacific Partnership analysis of economic and trade
related issues are critical. Meredith Lewis42 argues that the United States and the USTR must
take on a leadership role and offer substantial incentives for Asia-Pacific nations to join the

40

Long, 2014.
Cameron and Tomlin (2000)
42
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, Boston
College International and Comparative Law Review 27 (2011) http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol34/iss1/3/,
Accessed May 7, 2015.
41

15

agreement. If the partnership is not sufficiently attractive, she believes the U.S. will risk losing
countries to alternative bilateral or multilateral models. She positions the TPP as an opportunity
to simplify the “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs. Furthermore, the TPP presents a chance to formalize
U.S.-Asia economic integration, while providing avenues for additional countries to join.
Additional scholarship on the United States and the TPP comes from two extensive reports by
the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The 2013 report43 is a comparative trade and
economic analysis reviewing the current economic relationship between the TPP partners.
Detailing trade and economic conditions, the report emphasizes the diversity of the TPP partners
and potential areas of opportunity such as Japan’s entry. Although Japan-U.S. trade is
considerable, there is no current FTA formalizing relations. The 2015 CRS report 44 analyzes the
core negotiating issues including market access, trade rules, and Congressional concerns.
Second, an alternative lens to analyze the Trans-Pacific Partnership is through
geopolitical and strategic importance. One of the fundamental geopolitical concerns is China’s
rise as an economic and political force. Chinese ascendency alters a once unipolar world forcing
the United States to make difficult decisions. Tellis posits that there are four options: continue the
diplomatic course while recognizing the positives from China’s ascendency; negotiate future
Sino-American agreements to foster additional economic integration; stymie Chinese success
through containment; and outgrow the Chinese to maintain American supremacy.45 Tellis claims
the fourth option is likely the best, but can only take place by improving efficiency and
innovation, enhancing U.S. commitment to military domination, and supporting the power of
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rival nations such as Japan, India, and Vietnam. From this perspective, global trade and
economic liberalization must strengthen U.S. power.
Additionally, authors such as Li and Whalley 46 explore the potential effects of
participant and non-participant countries. China can gain significant economic benefits by
participating in the TPP negotiations. However, as the agreement stands, China is positioned to
lose out economically in terms of welfare (although the effects are not large), while the TPP
participants are situated to benefit. Japanese participation will compound lost revenue if Beijing
remains on the sidelines. The literature on China’s role in the TPP negotiations is important.
With over a decade of unprecedented economic growth, China will remain a regional hegemonic
power. Beijing’s response will produce invariable and unintended consequences for the TPP’s
implementation.
Third, the final theme of TPP literature is in nontrade related issues. Often this includes
reports from non-profit or activist groups like Public Citizen,47 Sierra Club, 48AFL-CIO,49 and
the Center for Economic and Policy Research.50 Each organization has released reports relating
to areas of specialization. The Sierra Club has highlighted the necessary expansion of fossil fuels
due to the TPP’s implementation. The AFL-CIO has repeatedly positioned FTAs like NAFTA
and the TPP against labor rights. The U.S. government ignores human rights abuses and
violation of basic labor standards when participating in FTAs with countries such as Mexico,
Brunei, and Vietnam. Public Citizen actively opposed the TPP particulars such as the
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procurement chapter enabling foreign firms operating in the U.S. equal access to government
contracts. Research centers like the Center for Economic and Policy Research have analyzed the
economic impact on U.S. wages. Median wage earners are likely to be negatively impacted by
any form of agreement. U.S. economic gains are likely to be minimal (.13 percent of GDP by
2025) while top income earners will disproportionately benefit.
International relations literature on state cooperation, regimes, and norms provides key
insight for ways in which states understand negotiations. Regimes can be defined, according to
Stephen Krasner, as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”51 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane
identify the formation of regimes as a method for international cooperation.52 Regimes alter
transaction costs for states, helping provide information while reducing uncertainty.
Additionally, regimes increase reciprocity among partners making defection much more unlikely
due to greater consequences. They write, “setting up international regimes, and attempting to
gain acceptance for new norms are all attempts to change the context within which actors operate
by changing the very structure of their interaction.”53
Additionally, scholarship on norm diffusion offers important ways to consider regime
development. Finnemore and Sikkink’s work on norm ‘life cycle’ is understood as a three stage
process: norm emergence, norm acceptance or norm cascading, and internalization.54 Norm
emergence, or when a norm first appears, is advanced by norm entrepreneurs attempting to
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persuade states to adopt specific policy. Norm cascades can be understood as an inflection point
in which a critical mass of state actors adopt a policy. The third phase, internalization, takes place
when a norm becomes widely accepted across a populace or nation.55 The process by which
norms manifest or embed within regimes elucidates key mechanisms in the United States’ efforts
to utilize the TPP for regime expansion.
Currently, comparisons are drawn describing the TPP as a bloated, swollen version of
NAFTA.56 Despite similarities in association, equating the TPP as merely a larger version of
integration is inaccurate. I aim to fill in gaps in the current scholarship analyzing the TransPacific Partnership. The overwhelming bulk of the literature on TPP centers on potential
economic impact or geopolitical consequences. There are holes in the current TPP scholarship
which do not analyze the agreement as an expansion of international regimes, specifically
intellectual property and ISDS. I will examine the United States’ TPP-strategy on
unconventional trade issues and its intent to broaden intellectual property and ISDS international
regimes. This contribution to TPP scholarship adds to the literature on cooperation, transaction
costs, and norm diffusion.
The following chapter will compare U.S. negotiating efforts during NAFTA and the TPP.
The analysis reveals the TPP’s main focus to be on nonconventional trade issues, highlighting
regime expansion to be a high priority for U.S. negotiators. Negotiations begin with a broad
agenda and rigid tactical positions. However, as domestic factors’ importance increase
concessions become more likely. Additionally, subchapters focusing on intellectual property and
ISDS explain the historical development of these regimes. Key focus is given to methods
through which the regimes will expand, due to the U.S. hegemonic efforts. The intellectual
55

Ibid.
Public Citizen,“NAFTA Terms Replicated in TPP” http://www.citizen.org/documents/tpp-nafta-on-steroidsinfographic.pdf, Accessed June 30, 2015
56

19

property regime’s textual substance will increase in areas of copyrights, patentability, and
enforcement. The ISDS regime will be strengthened by locking in additional nations, increasing
areas of protection, and growing misuse of the mechanism by corporations.
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Chapter III: Trans-Pacific Partnership
In the fall of 2011, President Obama announced a shift in the United States’ strategic focus
toward the Asia-Pacific region on military and economic matters. Inheriting a foreign policy
predominantly fixated on the Middle East, the Obama administration set out on a renewed path to
align current government resources with future priorities. In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton penned a piece for Foreign Policy describing this regional policy as a “pivot point.”57
Clinton further articulated interest in expanding economic liberalization through agreements such
as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. This rebalancing became a cornerstone for the Obama
administration’s foreign policy objectives, and the principal economic and foreign policy
component of the ‘pivot to Asia’ is the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is often compared to NAFTA because of the particularly
ambitious nature of the two agreements. Each deal, exhaustively pursued by U.S. officials,
stressed similar sector concerns such as trade in goods and services, tariffs and trade barriers,
government procurement, and investment. During the early 1990s, NAFTA’s drafters aimed to
unite North America in the most significant regional trade deal in U.S. history. Today, the TPP’s
creators have been equally ambitious with their inclusion of parallel components relating to goods
and services, tariffs, and market access. However, despite these commonalities which are often
noted,58 the TPP dwarfs all prior U.S. trade agreements in scope and ambition. An analysis of
trends within U.S. free trade negotiations beginning with NAFTA, as well as a dissection of
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emerging issues or geopolitical developments, illuminates the TPP as a novel and extraordinary
twenty-first century agreement.
The subsequent chapter is broken into three parts focusing on three dimensions that
underscore how the TPP dwarfs all prior U.S. trade agreements (including NAFTA) in scope and
ambition: U.S. negotiating tactics, intellectual property, and investor-state dispute settlements.
First, although U.S. negotiating styles in NAFTA and the TPP are similar in many respects,
points of divergence highlight TPP’s enhanced role in regime expansion. In both cases, due to
overwhelming economic, military, and strategic advantages, initial U.S. negotiating methodology
is built on aggression, rigidity, and ambition. Numerous domestic factors, including national
elections, political legacy, and Congressional discord alter power alignments in international
trade negotiations. Yet, despite aggressive stances during negotiations, myriad domestic
influences have led negotiators to become willing to grant important concessions on specific
issues. In spite of demonstrated flexibility, the steadfast positions on specific TPP issues
highlights the agreement’s expansive nature. For example, during current TPP negotiations, U.S.
concessions on controversial pharmaceutical pricing while simultaneously failing to agree on
intellectual property or ISDS issues highlights the heightened level of importance these areas
hold for the Obama administration. Although similar hostile negotiation styles are implemented
across the two agreements, U.S. rigidity in negotiating these two issue areas help reveal the
TPP’s focus on regime expansion.
Second, while NAFTA’s primary focus centered on North American economic
integration, the elucidation of the TPP’s key significance requires a detailed analysis of nontraditional trade areas. NAFTA certainly contained provisions addressing intellectual property,
but the agreement was largely about trade and economic liberalization. The TPP is much less a
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traditional trade deal, as only a handful of the proposed 29 chapters pertain to classical trade
issues. These additional functional areas which are protected by intellectual property rights will
further the international regime’s scope. Based on early leaked documents, U.S. negotiators are
attempting to enhance the normative underpinnings of intellectual property. The United States is
seeking to expand the intellectual property regime in a few critical areas, including copyright
protection, patentability, and enforcement. Additionally, by framing the text as a “living
agreement”59 enabling countries to accede after negotiations are complete, the Asia-Pacific
agreement will bind other countries to the normative underpinnings of the regime.
Lastly, the United States insistence on strong investor protections aims to strengthen the existing
investor-state regime. Although Chapter XI was a key component of NAFTA, the subsequent
role of investor protections has created a markedly different environment in which the TPP will
operate. The investor-state regime will be strengthened through a variety of avenues such as the
increasing utilization of the regime’s mechanisms. The creation of a living agreement will bind
additional states to the mechanisms. Moreover, investor-state dispute settlements have evolved
beyond a mere bilateral protection of foreign capital to an international regime engrossing
exceedingly more complex areas such as e-commerce, state-owned enterprises, and small- and
medium-sized business. The agreement’s focus on nonconventional trade issues will further
activate and entrench the investor-state regime.

United States Negotiations
Comparisons between NAFTA and the TPP are accurate in terms of the asymmetrical
power distribution among participating nations. The North American partnership consists of
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countries with fundamentally unequal power dynamics. In 1995, the United States contained
close to 90% of North America’s GDP.60 In the current twelve nation negotiations, the United
States accounts for nearly 60% of the TPP’s GDP, or $15.5 trillion. 61 Despite slightly less
economic weight, the U.S. is still a main driver of the TPP negotiations. Due to asymmetries in
power, U.S. negotiating tactics have followed similar trajectories. Having significant negotiating
advantages in economic and technological capacity, the United States has maintained unrelenting
and aggressive stances in early negotiating periods. The U.S.’ persistently dogged positions
make consensus difficult and elucidate critical issue areas, such as intellectual property and
investor-state dispute settlements.
At the same time, domestic concerns play a vital role in U.S. negotiators’ tactics and
stances. As election cycles near, and the need to win approval from the electorate increases, U.S.
negotiators are willing to concede points of contention. Congressional approval granting
President Obama Trade Promotion Authority (TPA or fast track authority) typifies domestic
concerns and enhances the speed of implementation. The remarkable blending of party lines
enabling fast track authority highlights domestic priorities, especially in light of a historically
sluggish Congress.
At the beginning of NAFTA negotiations diverging strategic, economic, and political
positions produced varying levels of confidence and urgency among the negotiating countries.
Having recently completed the 1988 Canada-United States FTA, Mulroney was assured in the
Canadian position within the hemisphere. The Canadian aim was to maintain the existing
agreement and, if possible, build on the FTA. In contrast, the Salinas administration felt an
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urgency to negotiate NAFTA. The Mexican debt crises and shifting domestic ideology
reinforced an urgency to finalize a trade agreement. Mexico was willing to make numerous
concessions during the negotiations; from the Mexican vantage point, the accord seemed to be
the best option.
The United States found itself in a much different negotiating position. Due to its
advantages in economic heft, technology, military, and strategic position, the U.S. maintained
steadfast stances in part because it did not truly need NAFTA to achieve its trade objectives. 62
Negotiators unrelentingly pushed for reforms such as procurement and intellectual property
provisions. U.S. negotiators wanted to improve U.S. firms’ access to government contracts, and
were especially interested in Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state-owned petroleum
company. While the Mexicans proposed access to 30% of contracts, the Americans pushed back
for 50% and guarantees on the level of exports. From the outset of negotiations, the United States
resolutely pushed for strong intellectual property protections on patents, trademarks, and
copyrights.63
Even with asymmetrical power distributions, the United States’ steadfast approach
became malleable due to domestic constraints. As the 1992 Presidential election came near, the
Bush administration’s need for a regional trade deal became more apparent. Despite a successful
campaign in the Gulf War, President Bush was attacked along domestic lines. Bill Clinton’s
presidential campaign in 1992 memorialized this sentiment arguing, “It’s the economy, stupid”.64
The likelihood of U.S. concessions increased as “American impatience was exploited more by
the Canadians than the Mexicans, nevertheless U.S. haste in August was one factor that
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contributed to Mexico’s ability to avoid concessions in energy.”65 Despite winning hard-fought
concessions from Mexico on issues like government procurement and strong intellectual property
protections, lead negotiator Carla Hills and her U.S. team conceded issues like guarantees on
PEMEX export levels. 66 This negotiating transformation is in large part attributed to a domestic
political concern of completing a deal before the Republican convention.
The current Asia-Pacific negotiations have followed a similar trajectory of rigidity and
aggression, followed by haste and concessions linked to domestic political concerns. However,
by examining contentious issue areas and observing which issues the U.S. negotiators will not
concede, U.S. intentions to strengthen particular regimes becomes clear. For the United States,
intellectual property is a prime issue area affecting a wide swath of U.S. firms. Patent protection
for pharmaceutical companies is a big concern among the TPP partners.67 The reproduction of
generic or unregulated drugs erodes the bottom-line of U.S. drug companies. U.S negotiators
have doggedly held to strong intellectual property protections, including longer patent terms for
innovative products, patent holders’ right to act against the introduction of a similar product, and
limitations on domestic flexibility to control prices of medicine within their territory.68
Pharmaceutical pricing is one of the more contentious demands, as critics have maintained that it
will provide higher reimbursement rates for American pharmaceutical companies at the expense
of consumers.
Meanwhile, U.S. negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership are currently transforming
their tactics as a result of similar domestic factors their predecessors experienced during North
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American integration. As President Obama nears the conclusion of his second term, the need to
complete a deal securing his legacy is quickly escalating; as demonstrated earlier, the TPP is
cornerstone of the President’s Asia policy. 69 Further, for the upcoming election cycle it is
important for Democrats to burnish their economic and foreign policy credentials. A 2016
Democratic election victory and a president’s historical legacy are more than enough motivation
to complete the TPP agreement in the near future. U.S. negotiators are adjusting bullish tactics
while conceding issue areas to push the agreement further along. Despite its previous
determination to include pharmaceutical pricing in the agreement, the U.S. dropped the issue of
pharmaceutical pricing from their list of demands in June 2015. 70 The American negotiators’
strong-arm approach followed by concessions on disputed provisions reflects the trajectory of the
NAFTA negotiations. In both cases, they represent political decisions based on impending
elections, the looming end to a presidential administration, and the perceived need to conclude
negotiations rapidly.
U.S. negotiators’ willingness (or lack thereof) to concede issue areas elucidates
priorities and the dramatic nature of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. Although final
U.S. concessions are unknown,71 aggressive and unyielding positions for specific issue areas
communicate a heightened level of importance for Washington. At this time, it is reported that
various chapters are complete, including those on telecommunications, small and medium
enterprises, and regulatory coherence. These chapters were purportedly met with relatively little
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controversy and a general consensus was established.72 This quick consensus among a disparate
group of agents likely means there are few substantive changes from current international regimes
or norms. These chapters likely further align nations with current standards as opposed to pushing
international norms and regimes beyond existing regulations. While these are important to the
United States, the USTR is likely to have placed considerable negotiating capital behind other,
higher priority issues that advance U.S. interests, and do not merely continue the status quo. Prior
to the most recent negotiating session held in March, a number of contentious issues were still left
to be worked out, including intellectual property and investor-state dispute settlements.73 The
difficulty in negotiations and creating consensus for both issues highlights the importance that the
United States places on significantly altering the norms and expanding the reach of U.S.-based
regimes in these areas even when faced with resistance from its partners.
Levels of priority for issues such as investor-state disputes and intellectual property can
be partially deduced from current impasses. Developed nations have a significant comparative
advantage in these areas of specialization. This comparative advantage for the United States is
manifested in a variety of negotiating points. For example, Japan and the United States are still at
odds over Japan’s willingness to open its agriculture and auto market to foreign imports. On the
surface, this seems to be a traditional trade issue of foreign access weighed against protection of a
domestic market. The Japanese are certainly aware of potential consequences to domestic
agriculture production that would result from increased access of American beef and dairy
producers. However, additional considerations facing negotiators promote a climate of minimal
consensus. Due to the expansive nature of intellectual property and investor-state dispute
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settlements, agriculture is not merely about growing and selling goods. The investor-state regime
has been utilized frequently on agriculture issues relating to pesticide use, such as Chemtura
Corporation v. Canada74 and Dow AgroSciences v. Canada.75 By promoting increased market
integration with robust investor protections, the likelihood of costly litigation increases in areas
such as Japanese agriculture and auto manufacturing. Based on recent history exemplified in the
Chemtura and Dow AgroSciences cases, Canadian and American negotiators are certainly aware
of the legal implications and potential costs of international adjudicatory mechanisms. These
mechanisms demonstrate the United States’ desire to go beyond existing norms and agreements,
while insisting on a convergence of Western-oriented regimes.

Intellectual Property
The expansion of intellectual property rights demonstrates noteworthy differences
between the two free trade agreements while highlighting the TPP’s lofty and ambitious agenda.
The intellectual property provision of NAFTA was groundbreaking for the region. Prior to
signing NAFTA, Mexico was one of the world’s largest pirates of intellectual property. In 1991,
President Salinas signed Mexico’s new IP law, the Law for the Promotion and Protection of
Industrial Property.76 Under this law, new patents were extended to microorganisms,
biotechnological and pharmaceutical chemicals, and plant varieties. Trademarks were extended
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to a ten year protection. First time copyrights were given to computer software and recordings.77
The 1991 law was significant because Mexico was brought in line with international IP law,
making the implementation of NAFTA provisions less radical. Canada’s significant IP
protections created commonality with the United States, smoothing negotiation of intellectual
property rights.
One of NAFTA’s key contributions to intellectual property was to raise the standard of
protection to an international treaty obligation; Chapter XVII established the overarching
commitments for North American intellectual property.78 Chapter XVII begins by recognizing
four prior conventions relating to intellectual property: The Geneva Convention for the
Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms
(1971), the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971), the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1967), and the International Convention for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (1978).79 Key Chapter XVII intellectual property
provisions include: expanded authority of IP owners to impound infringing goods at customs;80
expanded judicial authority to issue injunctions ordering violators to stop illegal activity;81
“pipeline protection” for pharmaceutical and chemical products;82 and protection for
semiconductor integrated circuits.83 These key features of the agreement’s text helped codify
intellectual property rights within the North American region. At the time these were unique and
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impactful. However, subsequent international treaties, evolving international norms, and
advances in technology position NAFTA’s intellectual property provisions as a beginning and
not an end.
Over the past three decades since the implementation of NAFTA, developed nations like
the United States have been primary drivers in the development of international intellectual
property law. Contemporary agreements providing the framework for intellectual property
include the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
developed under the GATT, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), and World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The TRIPS agreement, ushered in during the
Uruguay Round which concluded in 1994,84 was heralded as the most comprehensive
international intellectual property agreement in history.85 At the time, intellectual property
protection was a primary concern of the U.S., as pirates in developing countries diminished
corporate profits. During this period, U.S. industries lost an estimated $60 billion due to piracy
and lax enforcement.86 It was presumed that the risk and cost of innovation, coupled with losses
from piracy, created a significant trade barrier. The rampant losses from piracy were felt
throughout the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, entertainment and artistic sectors,
and high-end fashion. Strong patent, copyright, and trademark protection were stressed.
Although NAFTA negotiators were certainly privy to the text and ambition of TRIPS, TRIPS
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legal jurisdiction went beyond the regional agreement to include all GATT members. The
agreement not only set standards for investor protection, but required domestic enforcement, as
well as dispute settlement mechanisms.87
Coming on the heels of TRIPS, the ACTA is the most recent multilateral agreement
enforcing both criminal and civil IP. The agreement was signed on October 1, 2011 by Australia,
Canada, European Union, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea,
Switzerland and the United States. The general areas of concern included civil enforcement,
border measures, criminal enforcement, and enforcement in the digital environment.88 Falling
outside the scope of any international institution, the agreement excluded participation from
developing countries.89 Whereas TRIPS allowed for flexibility in compliance, ACTA is rigid for
developing countries wishing to accede. The ACTA includes text about developing additional
institutional arrangements, such as a Secretariat.90
A final predecessor of TPP’s proposed intellectual property regime is WIPO, which was
established in 1970 and became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1974. WIPO
serves three primary functions: to administer numerous international agreements, including the
Patent Cooperation Treaty; to promote the expansion of intellectual property legislation
throughout the developing world; and to create a forum for policy development to extend global
governance of intellectual property.91 In addition to this mandate, in 2004 many developing
country members with support from international non-governmental organizations (INGOs)
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fought to augment WIPO’s responsibilities with a development-oriented focus.92 Despite
questions about WIPO’s relevancy due to bureaucratic constraints, the organization has regulated,
promoted, and administered intellectual property rights for over four decades. The development of
TRIPS, ACTA, and WIPO are key precursors to the role and expansive nature of intellectual
property in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Notwithstanding the secret and closed-door policy of the TPP negotiations, two draft
texts of intellectual property chapters have been leaked.93 The release of these early proposals
demonstrate the extent to which U.S. negotiators seek to advance intellectual property rights. The
framework for the intellectual property chapter is built on the “controversial standards of the
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA).”94 In many instances, the drafts reveal expansive ambitions beyond any prior U.S.
agreement including NAFTA, TRIPS, or the ACTA. For example, a proposed issue from 2011
grants intellectual property holders the ability to prohibit all forms of reproduction, including
temporary storage in electronic form. While this was included in KORUS, it is not actually
present in domestic U.S. copyright law.95 Domestic copyright law has a “fixed”96 quality which
does not apply to temporary electronic copies. Further expansion of intellectual property law can
be found in the 2011 U.S. proposal for intellectual property. The chapter provides exclusive
rights to intellectual property owners to determine prices and policies for entry into new
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markets.97 This provision enables copyright owners to prevent the parallel importation into
a partnering country, shifting this right from domestic law to copyright holder.98 This shift
of rights to the copyright owner has little precedent in existing treaty requirements.
Furthermore, the proposed agreement would expand the concept of patentability. Patents
remain one of the more controversial issues under intellectual property. The U.S. proposal seeks
to align the TPP’s membership with U.S. intellectual property standards. The proposed chapter
would broaden patentability’s definition, increase patent terms, impose data exclusivity, and
restrain TRIPS flexibility.99 Under NAFTA and TRIPS, requirements for a patent centered on
being new or innovative.100 The proposed agreement permits patents even if the new method does
not enhance the product. Each new product would result in a 20-year patent. This exposes
developing countries to a host of chemical, drug, formula, and dosage modifications, which do
not necessarily add value, yet are greeted with protection.101 In addition, overly broad concepts of
patentability threaten developing countries ability to produce generic drugs or make
innovative developments. The United States’ intentions to increase patentability’s breadth and
depth demonstrate the potential of the TPP on the international intellectual property regime.
The TPP’s intellectual property provisions seek to expand the issue of enforcement
beyond existing levels of international law and norms. Enforcement of intellectual property is a
priority for particular industries and nations. Open letters from 2010 reveal the degree to which
97
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enforcement has been a priority for intellectual property rights’ proponents from the beginning
of the negotiations. The International Intellectual Property Alliance, a coalition of seven
associations representing U.S. copyright industries, wrote on numerous occasions to the USTR
expressing desire for strong criminal remedies for infringement, ex officio authority for criminal
actions and border measures, and provisions for various piracy issues. 102 Past intellectual
property regimes have not staked out significant claims for IPR enforcement. In 2011, U.S.
negotiators aimed to shift standards by reducing thresholds for enforcement. Two points of
shifting thresholds include obligations for enforcement and injunctions. Proposed expansion
seems to imply an elevated level of compliance that includes shifting domestic resources to
enforce protocols. Additionally, proposed expansion of injunction relief requires states to not
only stop the importation of materials that infringe IPR protections, but to also halt any believed
exports.103
The expansion of enforcement provisions, which seeks to shift the burden from private
holders onto the public, is a critical issue for developing nations. This burden for many
developing nations is perilous because of limited financial and institutional resources. If nations
cannot meet this threshold they would be in danger of violating international treaty obligations.
Due to the intensive pressure that U.S. negotiators are applying in the intellectual property rights
arena, enforcement provisions will likely expand beyond existing levels. Additionally,
enforcement rests on principles that are unbalanced; protected goods such as pharmaceuticals
benefit from exclusionary pricing which adversely effects many consumers.104 Protection and
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exclusive pricing are themselves major causes for pirating and copyright infringement.105 As the
living agreement allows for nations to accede in the future, the United States seeks to rewrite
intellectual property regulations not in an open setting like TRIPS and the WTO, but the rather
veiled context of free trade negotiations. Despite not having any official text through WTO
forums, leaked documents suggest that the TPP will expand the breadth and depth of
international intellectual property rights regime.

Investor-State Dispute Settlements
Investor-state dispute settlements comprise another key component of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership’s ambitious agenda. This dispute mechanism was originally conceived as a protective
instrument for investors interested in risky foreign investment. Trade policy theory held that the
establishment of a forum to seek remedies would establish the necessary conditions for the
proliferation of foreign direct investment.106 Developed countries would receive greater
assurance of investment safety, while developing countries would benefit from increased streams
of capital.
The United States has negotiated numerous bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the
inclusion of dispute mechanisms, but NAFTA’s investor-state dispute settlement was unique. For
the first time in North America, an institution was established to arbitrate claims between two
developed nations. Before NAFTA the primary function of ISDS was to mediate disputes
between developed and developing countries. Although investors were largely concerned with
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Mexico’s compliance with international investment, many of the early claims filed under
NAFTA were between the United States and Canada.107 Since the early 1990s, hundreds of
investor-state dispute clauses have been included in bilateral and multilateral trade accords.108
The TPP is positioned to greatly increase the role of ISDS in trade policy across the
region and beyond. The existing normative framework, developed from numerous BITS and
multilateral agreements, will be strengthening by a desire to further entrench the investor-state
regime. The frequency of ISDS claims, changing normative use of ISDS, expansion in
unconventional issue areas, and the erosion of sovereignty underscore the unrestrained potential
for investor-state dispute settlements under the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Early interpretations of investor-state dispute mechanisms often understood the policy to
be a protective measure. Despite having roots in prior BITs, the North American agreement was
revolutionary for linking two developed countries and one developing country with an
international dispute mechanism and granting investors direct access to recourse. Prior to the
agreement parties seeking recourse could not bring claims directly. Rather, firms were required to
petition states to negotiate on their behalf. Chapter XI enabled corporations to file suit with
national governments for any regulatory activity which diminished profits; additionally,
corporations can make claims to protest anticipated future profits.109 Although NAFTA’s critics
warned against limitations on national sovereignty and the right to legislate on behalf of public
goods, many found Chapter XI to be instrumental to direct foreign investment.110 Without
substantive protections, investors from the United States and Canada found it difficult to risk
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capital across the border. By bolstering international norms for investment, investors had a
legitimate method to seek redress outside their domestic government.111 Although Chapter XI
was not entirely innovative, having its roots in past BITs, the scope of the agreement, coupled
with an explosion of investor-state dispute settlements in additional trade agreements, positions
NAFTA as a strong starting point for TPP-ISDS analysis.
NAFTA’s codification of investor-state dispute settlements helped consolidate the
investor-state regime in subsequent trade agreements. Since the early 1980s there have been over
3,268 international investment agreements.112 The advancement of the investor-state regime has
helped institutionalize the adjudicatory practice. Under Chapter XI, an explosion of disparate
claims were brought against the North American partners. Most of the claims filed under
NAFTA are related to environmental policy, public health, land use, and transportation
policies.113 By 2010, American investors had submitted 27 claims to Canada under NAFTA.114
There were 42 new ISDS cases initiated in 2014.115 Despite critics myriad concerns, including
the infringement of state sovereignty, constitutional overstep, and environmental exploitations,
investor protections embedded in development economics’ prescriptions have prevailed as the
dominant policy course.116 The frequency in which ISDS have occurred under NAFTA and other
trade agreements provides some context for the current negotiations. Due to their increasing
111
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regulatory role, normative acceptance, and public policy reliance, the investor-state regime
becomes further ingrained as the TPP continues this precedential path to investor rights.
The expansive nature of the investor-state regime under the TPP is due in part to recent
usage of ISDS claims by corporations. The adjudicatory mechanism is becoming increasingly
entrenched in international trade policy, with cases covering disparate areas such as the operation
of domestic courts, denial of regulatory permits, environmental and public health issues,
extractive industries, and emergency management during financial tumult.117 Although protection
of foreign direct investment is a legitimate concern, corporations are utilizing the investor-state
regime despite lawful national regulation.
Increasing utilization of the investor-state regime and dubious incursion into matters of
public welfare have fundamentally altered the landscape in which the TPP will operate. In 2011, in
the wake of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in Japan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
announced plans to shut down the nation’s nuclear program by 2022.118 Notwithstanding national
safety and energy concerns, Swedish utility Vattenfall sued Germany for €3.7 billion in
damages.119 Moreover, the Renco Group sued Peru after the government shut down a metal
smelter in La Oroya amidst local health concerns. After failing to meet two deadlines to install
sulfur plants to help alleviate local environmental and health problems, Renco brought an $800
million suit under the U.S.-Peru FTA. This notoriously polarized case positioned one of the
world’s wealthiest owners, Ira Rennert, against the people of La Oroya.120 Changing normative
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practices and the investor-state regime’s incursion into matters of public welfare have created a
fundamentally altered landscape in which the TPP will be implemented.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership’s drafters are seeking to further increase levels of investor
protection by binding nations to the investor-state regime. Currently, the United States has
existing ISDS agreements in force with six TPP countries. The remaining partners – Australia,
Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, and New Zealand – are party to 100 agreements containing dispute
mechanisms. 121 Of these partners which have no investor-state pact with the United States, at
least 9,274 corporations would gain the ability to file claims against Washington. Conversely, the
United States has 18,585 corporations in these five countries.122 By attempting to bind the five
remaining partners, the U.S. government will bolster the pharmaceutical and technology
industries through increased market access, product and patent control, and revenue in markets
such as Malaysia, Brunei, and New Zealand.
The U.S is markedly confident in this trade strategy in part because it has defended
numerous claims without suffering defeat. The inclusion of ISDS will buttress U.S. power in
emerging areas of TPP such as intellectual property and internet freedom. However, the TPP
partners do not lack agency and some are vocal critics of the mechanism. This issue area has
been particularly contentious during the negotiations. The Australia-US FTA (AUSFTA) does
not contain an ISDS due to Australia’s persistent objections during negotiations. In 2011, the
Australian Government vehemently stated that it would no longer support dispute settlements
that put investor rights before public welfare. With changes in its national leadership, the
Australian position has vacillated during various trade negotiations, yet dispute mechanisms
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remain a significant point of contention. Similarly, despite having an ISDS with the United States,
Vietnam opposes expansive application of the investor protection regime. By including an
additional five nations to bind ISDS with the United States, investor protections will greatly
expand throughout the region.
The history of Chapter XI has shown that an expansion of the investor-state regime does
not always bode favorably for developed countries. Despite initial investor concerns about
Mexico’s disreputable image as an intellectual property pirate, Canada was the most frequent
defendant in Chapter XI suits. By 2015, of the 77 NAFTA investor-state disputes, Canada has
faced 35 cases and paid over $172 million. Since 2005, they have faced over 70% of all NAFTA
claims.123 Issue areas have included environmental protection, energy, pharmaceuticals, and
waste management. The post-1994 trend of developed partners filing suit against one another is
surely to continue with the TPP agreement. The potential for elevated levels of investor disputes
between Japan and the U.S. is quite stark. By binding to an international treaty with profit
generating rights, each country will risk litigation in areas of specialization including intellectual
property, pharmaceutical and technological production, natural resource exploitation and
protection, and financial regulation. These overlapping areas of interest will likely expand the use
of ISDS between developed nations. Although exact wording of the text and provisions of ISDS
is currently unknown, a multilateral treaty including developed TPP partners which do not
currently have ISDS with the U.S. will expand the investor-state regime.
By increasing substantive areas for which ISDS can be initiated, the mechanism will
become more firmly entrenched in international trade policy. The dispute settlement regime will
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expand beyond its current usages and engulf developed and developing partners in a plethora of
suits. For example, as the USTR notes, the TPP’s environmental working group124 is considering
new proposals involving marine fisheries, biodiversity, invasive alien species, and climate
change.125 However, by including a host of new environmental issues alongside the dispute
settlement regime, investors’ ability to seek recourse will be advanced. Legislation protecting
against environmental degradation will be in jeopardy due to the potential for these claims. As
demonstrated by the Renco Group vs. Peru, the regulation of industry after the implementation of
trade agreements and increased investor protections can be extremely difficult.
The regional accord’s handling of e-commerce presents unique opportunity for the
investor-state dispute mechanism to expand its reach. Although none of the e-commerce chapters
were leaked, based on country reports,126 privacy obligations in regard to information sharing is a
central concern. Additionally, the United States aims for unfettered cross-border data flows and
strongly opposes domestic requirements for data to be located in-country in order to promote
internet-based services and cloud-computing.127 With the actualization of a free flow of data
across borders, countries like Australia, Vietnam, and Malaysia could be exposed to ISDS suits
due to domestic legal requirements. E-commerce and new technologies built on the movement of
data would have issue with information stored locally on servers and large claims are plausible.
Additionally, the new cross-cutting issue of state-owned enterprises presents significant
ramifications for the expansion of dispute settlements. Traditionally, state-owned enterprises are
influenced by the government with the potential for subsidies, low cost credit, preferential access
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to government procurement, and trade protection. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore have
significant state-owned enterprises. Past trade agreements’ handling of state-owned enterprises
are inconsistent and offer varying possibilities for the state-owned enterprise chapter. Although
these enterprises are met with a general acceptance, specific provisions and exemptions are
uncertain. The consolidation and expansion of state-owned enterprises as an issue area under the
TPP presents investors with a potential grievance to be sorted out through arbitration.128
The final issue area which presents a unique opportunity for further integration of
investor-state dispute settlements is the inclusion of a small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) chapter. SMEs typically have particular difficulties accessing foreign markets, and the
chapter aims to improve greater access and liberalization. The chapter was completed in 2012,
but little has been released. SMEs account for 97% of international trade. The significant
presence of SMEs in international trade seemingly made the negotiations conclude with relative
rapidity. By promoting SMEs in international trade, and granting them improved access to FTA
mechanisms, businesses will have expanded access to all of the TPP’s levers, in particular
investor-state dispute settlements. Specifically, emerging tech-oriented businesses will find
adjudicatory relief from protectionist measures in foreign markets. By promoting greater access
to the TPP’s mechanisms, SMEs are likely to bring a host of new suits against foreign capitals.
Promotion of the trade accord, increased awareness of the agreement’s utility, and governmental
consensus position SMEs to play an important role in embedding investor-state disputes across
the region.
The investor-state regime uniting twelve countries across the Pacific Rim threatens to
continue the erosion of state sovereignty. The infringement on state sovereignty is not entirely
novel nor problematic by definition; however, implicit and explicit consequences due to ISDS
128
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claims can stymie legislation for the public welfare. Prior trade agreements set specific
parameters for which claims can be brought before an arbitrator. Anything falling outside the
text of the free trade accord remains a matter for national courts. However, the TPP’s intrepid
framework positions ISDS to become increasingly coercive and forceful. As the TPP’s text is
designed to be a living agreement, in the future both nations and substantive issues will be
weighed for admittance to the regional trade deal. The potential for the inclusion of
supplementary chapters positions the TPP to further erode sovereignty through the
advancement of the investor-state regime. As developed states fight more arbitrations, enacting
legislation to preserve the public good will become increasingly more difficult. States will need
to weigh the cost of national legislation protecting public health systems, environmental
sustainability, and economic reforms against international investment rights and the threat of
litigation. This implicit encroachment of a nation’s sovereignty is directly affected by the
regime’s coercive nature.
The investor-state regime’s structure and processes supplement the continued erosion of
state sovereignty. Questionable infringements on domestic judicial rights are raised by the use of
arbitrators in commercial disputes. The TPP’s three-person panel will be chosen by giving one
selection to the investor, one to the country being challenged, and one to the first two
arbitrators.129 International lawyers who serve on the three-person panels often fluidly move
between professional, corporate, or federal posts, and service on an international commercial
tribunal. Their revolving door raises questions pertaining to partiality. Furthermore, unlike U.S.
federal and state law, rulings need not rest in precedent. Each case is adjudicated on its own
character with no influence from an overarching body of law.
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Absent a final text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s investment chapter, important
insights can be extrapolated due to evolving normative positions. The increased frequency in
which ISDS suits have risen since the implementation of NAFTA position the TPP to be a
catalyst for further expansion. Additionally, the dubious use of ISDS by corporations seeking
incursion into public welfare matters have greatly expanded the investor-state regime. By
continuing this interpretative approach, the regime will become more fully entrenched in
international trade policy. Moreover, the TPP’s substantive expansion into cross-cutting issues
such as e-commerce and small and medium-sized businesses further exposes countries to risky
investment suits. The TPP’s ambitious agenda, coupled with developing normative behavior,
ultimately threatens to continue the transformation of the investor-state regime beyond a policy
to merely protect foreign capital. In the next chapter, three geopolitical conditions – Chinese
ascendancy, competing trade agreements, and climate change – are analyzed in relation to the
TPP’s implementation and sustainability.
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Chapter IV: Geopolitics
The ratification and implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership will bring the
agreement into direct confrontation with geopolitical realities across the region. Such realities
will either advance or prohibit the agreement’s effectiveness. Although all future conditions are
inevitability unknowable as demonstrated by the NAFTA framers’ failure to consider China’s
rise as a manufacturing power, the TPP will enter a world with specific conditions already
established. Three specific geopolitical conditions which are certain to collide with the TPP
include: Chinese ascendancy, competing trade agreements, and climate change. The subsequent
chapter analyzes each of these three conditions while exposing potential sources of conflict with
the Asia-Pacific accord. First, Chinese ascendancy must be analyzed through three lenses:
hegemonic power, economic primacy, and military capabilities. Each of these Chinese goals
presents unique obstacles, and the TPP partners must fully account for each while increasing
regional integration. Second, the TPP must remain attractive to potential partners in light of
competing agreements. The ongoing RCEP negotiations led by Beijing present an attractive
alternative option for nations seeking traditional trade agreements. Third, environmental health
and climate change present significant challenges to increased economic integration. Without
meaningfully addressing these potentially catastrophic conditions, the TPP risks becoming
obsolete. Ultimately, the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s future relevancy will be connected to the
participating nations’ ability to meaningfully engage with these three conditions.

Chinese Ascendency
Since the rise of the United States as a hegemonic power in the early 20th century, many
international regimes and institutions have largely reflected Western interests. Since the fall of
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the Soviet Union, no nation has meaningfully challenged American supremacy until China’s
recent rise to the global stage. The Trans-Pacific Partnership will collide with a new bipolar
world with Washington and Beijing sharing the helm. Future Sino-American relations will need
to address the largest regional trade deal in history. This future confrontation is ripe for analysis
in three areas: hegemonic power, economic primacy, and military capabilities. These three
Chinese goals will significantly impact the TPP’s implementation, as well as lasting stability.
First, the TPP agreement should be understood in part as a conflictual binary between
United States hegemony and Chinese ascendancy. With China’s historic economic success of
annual double-digit GDP growth, the United States position as global hegemon is unstable.
Scholars have argued that this dualism will inevitably lead to military conflict.130 It is unclear
whether those in Washington will concern themselves with relative or absolute gains,131 but it is
likely they will attempt to thwart China’s plan for a bi- or unipolar world with Beijing at the top.
The U.S. wants to maintain a strong foothold in China’s backyard by locking in trading partners
and allies. On April 6, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, speaking at Arizona State
University stated, “in terms of our rebalance in the broadest sense, passing TPP is as important to
me as another aircraft carrier would. It deepens our alliances and partnerships abroad... and it
would help us promote a global order that reflects both our interests and values.”132 The
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Secretary of Defense’s willingness to comment on a free trade deal implicitly highlights China
and the looming collision of hegemonic powers.
One of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s goals is to bolster American supremacy by
solidifying allies in Asia, specifically on issues imperative to American hegemony like intellectual
property. In order to understand the TPP as a mechanism to maintain U.S. hegemonic power, a
detailed review of Chinese advances and pressures is necessary. This threat to
American supremacy manifests itself through various means. With China’s ascendancy to
regional and world power, Beijing has not only achieved remarkable economic growth, but also
become a creator of international financial institutions, delivering enormous sums of
developmental aid across the world. China is actively competing for allies throughout economic
and financial leadership that directly threatens the status of the U.S. and European post-World
War II roles. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is led by Beijing, has established
an initial fund of $50 billion for regional development.133 In spite of strong opposition from the
United States, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has received applications from U.S.
allies including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as the TPP partners
Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam.134 The China Development
Bank and Export Import Bank of China lend more money to allied partners in the region than the
Asian Development Bank and the World Bank combined. Further, Chinese loans have increased
widely through Latin America and Africa. Many countries overly reliant on U.S. economic
integration were devastated during the 2008 financial crises. The Pacific Alliance consisting of
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Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile have expressed a need to diversify trading partners and are
beginning to look toward further Chinese integration.135 China’s role as a financial lender and
institutional leader has precipitously increased. International norms and institutional rules which
supported economic liberalization and Carter’s “global order” are in jeopardy.
Secondly, the threat to the global order of U.S. dominance comes in the form of Chinese
military ambition. Although Washington has substantially more strategic capabilities, recent
Beijing budgetary and policy decisions imply discontent with a second-rate military. According to
the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2015 Annual Report to Congress on military and security
developments in China from 2005 – 2014, China’s military budget grew by 9.5 percent.136 Much of
their military strategy focuses on regional concerns such as potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait,
East China Sea, and South China Sea. Additionally, according to the report, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) is seemingly willing to tolerate escalating levels of tension and conflict.
Much of their tactical advances focus on short-term, high impact conflict utilizing weaponry like
cruise and ballistic missiles. In 2015, Beijing announced a 12.2 percent rise in military spending
totaling almost $132 billion.137 Moreover, the recent revelations over the artificial island at
Mischief Reef in the South China Sea and the long running feud over the Spratly Islands138 are
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potential sources of conflict.139 If the Chinese are able to legitimize their naval presence through
these islands, there are potential ramifications for naval conflict, commercial fishing,
international shipping lanes, and exploratory drilling. 140 Escalating Chinese militarism will
likely have a symbiotic relationship with the TPP. For example, if Chinese control of shipping
routes impact Japanese access to oil, subsequent trade will be adversely affected. In addition, if
tensions on the Korean peninsula were to spill into conflict, a proxy war between China and the
United States is plausible. Increased military confrontation will affect production and trade,
shipping lanes, and diplomatic relations through a host of potential outcomes for the AsiaPacific trade agreement.
Lastly, the Chinese economy will greatly impact the TPP’s implementation and
effectiveness. Despite unprecedented economic growth, Beijing’s economic engine has cooled
since the financial crisis of 2008. Rates of real GDP growth have fallen from 10.4% in 2010 to
7.4% in 2014. Over the next six years, the IMF predicts China’s GDP growth with be roughly
5.9%.141 There are serious concerns that Beijing’s economic and financial practices will put
China at odds with the TPP. If the Chinese were to view the partnership favorably and want
some form of accession into the agreement, numerous issues would need to be addressed. Many
of the concerns include China’s undervalued currency, subsidies for domestic producers,
protectionist measures for specific industries and firms, widespread intellectual property theft,
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and significant barriers to market entry.142 The Chinese are also hedging against integration in
the TPP. Irrespective of the partnership, already in place are FTAs with a number of the TPP
partners such as Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, and Peru; a trilateral agreement with Japan and
Korea is also currently in negotiation. Ultimately, Beijing’s economic decisions and alliances
will impact the TPP’s implementation.

Competing Agreements
The second geopolitical condition which the TPP will encounter is alternative multilateral
trade options. The TPP will need to be attractive enough to compete with nations’ alternative
trade possibilities. For example, the proposed Regional Cooperative Economic Partnership
(RCEP) directly counters the TPP’s ambitious aims. The RCEP, led by the Chinese, rose out of
two prior 2006 FTA proposals.143 Beijing’s leadership during the RCEP negotiations is another
example of counterhegemonic ascendancy. Membership for RCEP includes the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)144 plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New
Zealand. RCEP addresses fewer issue areas than the TPP and wants to simplify the overlapping
FTAs of the ASEAN.145 For everything the TPP seeks to address, the RCEP offers a much more
traditional agreement focused primarily on reducing tariffs, eliminating discriminatory behavior,
and improving the climate for greater investment. Moreover, the agreement takes note of lessdeveloped economies. While the TPP is indifferent toward equitable economic growth, RCEP
aims to “address the special needs of less-developed ASEAN economies through early
142
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elimination of tariffs on products of interest to them.”146 This focus is of particular importance
due to great disparities in development among ASEAN members.
The RCEP and the TPP are being negotiating simultaneously with similar completion
dates. If the RCEP is completed first, the TPP will be adversely impacted. The relatively
demanding nature of the TPP may drive nations closer to the RCEP and increased integration
with China. A nation like Indonesia with significant human rights abuses,147 may find it more
appealing to agree to the less stringent requirements of the RCEP. The RCEP contains only six
non-tariff issues while the TPP has 20.148 There is significant incentive to be the first to finalize
negotiations and conclude the domestic ratification process. Although both sides are presumably
aware of this source of competition, the TPP nations will need work to maintain the agreement’s
attractiveness to potential partners.

Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability
The Trans-Pacific Partnership’s relationship with the environment presents myriad
complexities that impact the agreement’s implementation, as well as environmental
sustainability. This reciprocal relationship presents a number of challenges and opportunities
which must be addressed through the TPP’s environment chapter. Environmental degradation
and climate change may prove to be the most important geopolitical issue over the next century.
The greenhouse effect – gasses such as CO2 and methane trap solar energy causing the planet to
warm – is the principle behind climate change. Climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that
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human carbon emissions impact the earth’s warming temperature. Without significant protection
and regulation, the TPP agreement can easily add to the already staggering carbon emission
levels. Failing to secure comprehensive regulations and protections should not be acceptable to
negotiations. The potential for catastrophic conditions is too great for anything less than binding
commitments from all parties.
In spite of the stark scientific consensus acknowledging the looming threat, early drafts
leaked to the public were met with rancor. The 2014 leaked chapter was criticized by numerous
organizations for lacking basic protections.149 Groups like the Sierra Club and the World
Wildlife Fund lambasted the chapter for what appeared to be rollbacks on levels of national
commitment, recourse for violations, and fishery protections.150 If the environmental chapter
lacks heft, countering increased environmental erosion will be very difficult. Rising sea levels,
extreme weather conditions, and increased natural disasters threaten the TPP’s relevancy. In
particular, if the TPP fails to promote ecological health, Asia-Pacific trade may become less
feasible. ASEAN partners may look inward to reduce transportation costs, while simultaneously
protecting the environment. The partnership needs to address environmental erosion in a
meaningful and binding manner. If not, implications suggest the regional accord may lose
relevancy.
In light of critics’ grievances about the potential for increased environmental destruction,
the TPP is uniquely positioned to positively impact conservation. Illegally harvested timber is a
primary source of deforestation in the world. Recent changes in U.S. federal law requires evidence
on the country of origin and wood type before timber imports are permitted.151 Through these
requirements and increased communications with local agents, the importer has a strong
149
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incentive to harvest legal wood.152 By stopping illegal timber before importation, market demand
and the path of entry are greatly reduced for illegal loggers. An additional area of opportunity is
fisheries and the regulation of fish stocks. Each nation approaches this issue differently due to
disparate domestic commercial industries. For example, Indonesia is the second largest producer
of marine catches with 5,420,247 tons, growing by 27% from 2003-2012. During the same time
period, Chile’s production fell by 28.8% totaling 2,572,881 tones. The TPP partners face a host of
domestic issues regarding fish production such as Japan’s progressive reduction in its commercial
fleet and the Deepwater Horizon contamination in the United States.153 The various domestic
issues pertaining to commercial fishing will present obstacles to a cohesive chapter, yet still, the
TPP partners have a unique opportunity to form binding provisions enabling sustainable
commercial fishing.
Ultimately, if the Trans-Pacific Partnership is to fulfill its comprehensive and ambitious
agenda, it will ultimately need to do so in light of the three aforementioned geopolitical
conditions. Each condition offers unique obstacles and opportunities. Chinese ascendancy is a
direct threat to American hegemony. All parties will need to determine a path of cooperation or
hostility. Moreover, in order for the TPP to retain its viability it must remain attractive despite
alternative possibilities such as RCEP. Depending on various national perspectives, the breadth
and depth of the agreement will either alienate or attract potential suitors. Finally, climate change
presents potentially the most devastating geopolitical condition to Asia-Pacific integration.
International trade and the environment are intricately entwined; no longer can business and
economic enterprise ignore the ecological order. The TPP must address environmental wellness
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in a comprehensive, binding agreement which promotes and incentivizes alternative forms of
energy. The unsustainability of a global order run on fossil fuels is abundantly clear. These three
geopolitical conditions will have significant influence over future levels of Asia-Pacific
integration under the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is on the verge of expanding international intellectual
property and investor-state regimes beyond existing conditions. Developing in a climate of
precipitously increasing free trade agreements, the TPP is not merely another trade accord. Its
ambition in unconventional trade areas highlights particular goals and motivations of the
drafters. With the United States maintaining economic, military, and strategic position, the
international regimes are designed to preserve U.S. hegemonic power. Issues such as intellectual
property and ISDS bolsters U.S. areas of specialization, while concurrently binding allies to an
international accord favoring U.S. faculties. The United States’ efforts to expand the intellectual
property regime comes by way of broadening concepts such as copyrights patentability, and
enforcement. Additionally, U.S. negotiators seek to strengthen the ISDS regime through an
environment of increased utilization of the mechanism, binding additional nations to
international treaty obligations, and widening areas subject to adjudication.
Despite not having access to the final text, public information and scholarly analysis
reveal that the TPP will collide with existing geopolitical conditions. If the accord is to retain
longevity as an international force, the accord will need to address this reality. Chinese
ascendancy since the end of the 20th century, presents unique challenges to the U.S. hegemonic
order. The Chinese seek to challenge American hegemony, as well as bolster its economic
primacy and military capabilities. Moreover, international trade accords such as the RCEP,
which can also be understood as a counterhegemonic initiative, will compete directly with the
TPP. Asia-Pacific partners must cooperate to achieve the accord’s goals in order to provide a
competitive advantage over alternative agreements. Lastly, the cataclysmic potential of climate
change puts the future of international trade in peril. Without meaningful regulation of carbon
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emissions, as well as harnessing clean technology to enable international trade, trade deals
among such geographically distant nations may not be sustainable. The TPP partners must
engage each of these geopolitical conditions or risk having Asian-Pacific integration derailed.
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